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BY 
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DPT of Economics, U. Complutense !.Iadrici 
ABSTRACT 
We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the 
public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a Hash equilib::,ium (N.E.) in 
a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. fu~e L.E., but just those fo::, which the 
production of the public good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and Strong 
Equilibria coincide. However if the supply function is continuously differenti_ 
able,L.E. is never a N.E. We end the paper with sorne general comments about 
the nature of the incentive problem. 
(*) An earlier version of this paper benefited from comments of 
A. Mas-Colell and R. Repullo. 
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l. INTRODUCTION 
Since Samuelson classical dictum (see Samuelson, 1954,p.388), Lindahl equili-
brium (L.E.) has been considered as non incentive compatible, since " .. it is 
in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals". In this note I 
prove that if constant returns to scale in the production of public goods are 
assumed.L.E. is incentive compatible. This assumption is often made in some 
pepers concerned with the existence of a L.E. (see Roberts, 1974,p.33),or with 
the properties of mechanisms implementing the L.E. (see Hurwicz, 1979 and Vega 
1985) . 
We first prove that any L.E. is a Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) of a price-setting 
game. The idea behind our proof is very simple. Under conatant returns to 
scale the sum of prices payed by consumers must be equal to the average cost 
of producing the public good. Hence if a consumer pretends to paya lower 
price, no production of the public good is undertaken. Therefore he will end 
up being worse. So no one exploits the monopol, power that the mechanism 
gives him. Of course this phenomenon is closely related to limit theorems in 
Monopolistic Competition. As ~art (1979) proved, in 
listic competition is Pareto Efficient because 
large econo;;Iies, monopo-
dt",a"J. fV."'~·,OV1 be«llW.-J 
a horizontal lineo Hence~even if firms retain monopoly power, it does not pay 
to exploit it. In our case consumers have no incentive to deviate from Lindahl 
pd~es because the supply functioll is horizontal for any posi Uve pcodClction 
of public gOOd~~These reasonings are summarized in Proposition 1. 
We al so prove that any N.E. with positive production of the public good must 
be a L.E. (Proposition 2). Therefore in our economy, there are only two type$ 
of N.E. Those for which the results is Pareto Efficient, so the incentive 
, 
problem in fact does not arises and those for which the result is pure free 
(lE ) 
riding, so the incentive problem is quite severe. 
An interesting question is how to supplement Nash competition in prices in 
order to get full Pareto Efficiency in any case. The Strong Equilibrium (S.E.) 
notion appears to be a natural candidate in these circunstances. In this way 
we bring cooperation in order to remedy failures of Nash-Competition. 
(t) A related phenomenon has been studied by MakowsK1 -Ostroy (1984) in a 
different framework (a Walrasi~~ economy). 
(lE) It may be argued that this last kind of N.E. is not very relevant since 
it is Pareto dominated by any N.E. which achieves L.E. 
-'---~--~--------
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We show that L.E. is a S.E. (Proposition 3), i.e. no coalition can upset the 
L.E. allotation. Moreo.ver if utili ty functions are strictly quasi-concave, 
then any S.E. is a L.E. (Proposition 4). 
The precedent results may be understood in an intuitive sense as follows: 
The technological side fulfils the conditions of the so-called "No-Substitu-
tion Theorem ,,(lIE) (see for instance Arrow- Hah-... ch. 2). Therefore consumers 
are price-takers since prices are independent of demand (however apure free-
rider N.E. usually exists). This may be used to illustrate the danger of an 
aparently simplificatory assumption, i.e. the usual simple model of a public 
good economy may well be misleading in order to understand the incentive 
problem. 
The simplest way to depart from the "Non-Substitution Theorem" is to consider 
non constant returns to scale in the production side. In fact we show that if 
the supply function of the public good is continuously differentiable, results 
change dramatically. Any interior L.E. (under differentiability assumptions) 
cannot be a N.E. (Proposition 5). 
Putting together Propositions 1 to 5 we get the impression that continuous 
differentiabili ty may be a strong requirement in the incentive compal:" LbiLitl 
issue. (See the Satterwhite-Sonnenschein paper about Dominat Strategies and 
implementation in a Smooth framework). 
¡low"v"r a mechanism has been proposed (see Walker (~~Hll») ",hicn lmplements 
~lndahl allocations in Nash Strategies. This mechanism appears to work also 
for the differentiable case. (i.e. non constant returns to scale). However 
it must be said that the equilibrium notion proposed by Walker is, in spirit, 
very different form our's. In the approach presented in this paper, equilibrium 
is of the variety used in the industrial organization area: strategic agents 
(here, consumers) maximize their utility functions each assuming that the others 
will not change their strategies. On the other hand passive agentS(here the 
firm producing the public good) are represented by a function (here the supply 
function of the firm).· Strategic agents maximize taking as given this function 
which repr.esents the reaction of passi ve agents ~ r) 
(lIE) This means that the assumption of constant returns to scale is by itself 
not sufficient in order to get results similar to our Propositions 1-4. 
The assumptions o no joint production and an unique non-produced factor 
are also needed. 
(t) In the industrial organization li terature, roles are reversed. Active 
players are firms and passive agents are consumers. 
" 
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Therefore equilibrium he re has sorne Stackelberg-like flavour. In Walker 
approach the equilibrium notion is purely a Nash one.In particular,consumers 
do not incorporate to their maxirnization programs the supply functions of the 
firrn producing the public good, as if happens in our approach. Moreover if 
they do so, Walker mechanisrn ceases to achieve Lindahl alloctl.tions as simple 
examples can show. 
Of course this discrepancy of approache, calls for a discussion on what the 
issues dre in incentive theory. This is done in the last section. 
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In section 2 we explain the basic 
economy and the main definitions. In section 3 we treat the constant returns 
to scase case and in section 4 we treat the smooth case. Final cornrnents are 
gathered in section 5. 
l· 
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11 ; THE ~10DEL 
we follow a standard model in the lí terature (see Laffont (1984) 
Hurwicz (1979) or Vega (19B5)).There are n consumers,1 private 
good and 1 public good.The utility function of the i~consumer is 
U.~U,(y,x.) where y (resp. x.) is the quantity of the public 
(resp. private) good consumed by consumer i.Every consumer has 
a consumption set x. «;.R\,an initial endowment of the private 
, t 
good R. and a share in the profits of the firm producing the 
• 
public good 8, . Therefore his income is ~R; • 8~ lr(p) where 
" 1í(p)~maximum profits of the firm and p ~[p.,p.being the 
hl .. l 
Lindahl price of consumer i.There is a unique firm offering 
the public good.The cost function of the firm is c(y).The 
competi tive supply correspondence 1s y(p) ~l y E R.I py-c(y) ~ 
py'-c(y') YY"RtI.lT'(p)~PY(P)-C(y(p)).we will assume that 
U¡() is strictly increasing on xC' 
Now we will state our ma1n definitions. 
\.. ... 1,. • V Definition 1; A tuple (x "y,P.) lS said to be a L.E. if i o 1. .. n 
, " c..~"'f\ 
L 
a) p¡ E: R~ 
b L L •• ) (x¡,y) maX1m1ses L L U.(x.,y) over x,+p y~R.+91·1í(P) 
"lo c.(-' 
L L 
c) Y6y(p ) 
Notice that equilibrium in the prívate good market is implied 
by equilibrium in the public good market and walras Law. 
" "" , 'd t V Definition 2; A tuple (x y ,p,) lS sal o be a N.E. if i o 1. .. n 
• • &:. ... 1\ 
(Xr,~,p~) maximises U¡(x"y) over 
and ye y (P. + í: lJ ) 
L Jt, 
x ,.p. y ~ R .• 9·lí(p. + ~ PJ") 
L \ -,. \ j~i 
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In words,a N.E. is a list of strategies such that any consumer 
assuming that the rest of consumers are going to maintain their 
prices (i.e. they are price-setters) and that the firm is 
price-taker,finds no profitable to deviate from N.E. Of course 
other definitions are possible.For instance we can assume that 
consumers are quantity setters,so they conjecture that any 
deviation from his part is followed by a reaction which keeps 
the level of y constant.ln this case it is clear that no L.E. 
can be a N.E. However we feel that Definition 2 captures the 
Samuelsonian idea about incentives to misrepresents preferences. 
Indeed a possible interpretation of this Definition is that 
consumers send marginal rates of substitution.A N.E. is a list 
of consumptions and marginal rates of substitutions such that 
no consumer can improve his utility if the rest maintain their 
marginal rates of substitution. 
L In the rest of the pa;>er we will assume that y >0. This is a 
purely simplificatory assumption in the case of Propositions 
1-4.However Proposition 5 requires y~>O,but since this Proposition 
asserts that under smooth requirements no L.E. can be a N.E.,this 
is not an astringent requirement there. 
Finally we define a Strong Equilibrium (S.E.). 
A coalition e is a non-empty set of consumers. 
Definition 3; (p~,/) is said. to be a S.E. if Vcoalition e 
c. l!""''''' 
(p. ,y). such that 
"1 I ' I J'C 
a) Y'~Y(~Pi+L.P~ ) 
I~C ,'f-t S S S I J 
b) UJ(RJ+V(~P'+¿p .. )-PJ'Y',Y'»ü.(R.+1f(P )-PjY ,y )"j~c. 
JSe. i; c. J J ~ S 
c) (pt, 1~ satisfy the budget set of each consumer and y" y(p ). 
, ....... 
/ . 
7 
IlI;THE CONSTANT RETURNS 'fO SCALE CASE 
In this section we will assume that C(y)~c)O.Therefore 
y(p)~o if p<c, y(p)~to~) if p=c,and it is undefined if p) c 
Proposition l;If the technology displays constant returns to 
scale, then L. E. is .~ .N.E. 
L Proof;Consider consumer i.For prices higher than p. the supply 
c",r t 
correspondence oi the firm is not defined.So if the L.E. is not a 
!LE. it must be that he finds to 
But then 
"i..' • L. 
only O€s(~P. +~t) for P.(p··.So it must be jI, J" ,1 
U.(R.,O) 
L • 
contradicting that L.E. is individually rational. 
We may also prove a partial converse to Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2; Any N.E. with yl)O is a L.E. 
Proof; Since (P~,y~) is a N.E. it should maximise U .(R.-p.y,y) 
( , " " 
over yé y(p. +~PjL V i=l ... n. 
t J~i 11 
However if p~ I c-fpj we get eitner y=O or undefined.Therefore 
" (. J ... ; 
poi. =c-~p. (Le. is like if agent i were a price-taker). 
t ) l~ 11 
So in a N.E. Y maximises U¡(R,-P¡y ,y) over Y€,'(Cc.) 
But the last constraint is identical to y([O,oO). 
Therefore a N.E. is a L.E. 
Now we give a simple example in which N.E. is not a L.E. 
(*) If we bound the economy in the usual way in order to have y(p) 
well defined,consumers will not find profitable to increase P~ 
since they are already obtaining all they want at Lindanl prices. 
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Example 1; Let us assume that the utility function for each 
consumer is as pictured in Figure 1.Then if all players except 
i play p. =0 ,y=O is an optimal choice for i. 
J 
In other words,if prices were at their Lindahl levels,i should 
1. 
pay c/n in order to have y units of the public good.However 
if the rest of consumers pay nothing,i must pay c in order to 
have sorne public good, and under sorne circumstances this may l·ea! 
to ,,,,0 
Next Propositions will stablish the identity between the 
set of L.E. and S.E. 
Proposition 3; Any L.E. is a S.E. 
Proof.Suppose it is not,s03 C. (p:.y", such that 
\ l iEc; 
y • E y ( .~ p . + ~ Pi) and 
.. c. * ~ ~ ~ U',(R.-P:y',y'» u. (R, -P.y,y) ViéC 
" \ , " " 
By similar reasonings to Proposition 1 we ha ve 
, 1" - 1 i . h • L So i.f p¡ r Pj sorne ]/~' \'Ílt PI)P, . 
But then a grar lC argument shOl's that i cannot improve his 
utility (see Figure 1 and take p·=c,pL=c/n).Therefore p;=p~ 
¡ t" 
" i € c. But then l+uch that a11 agents in e can be made better off. 
In order to prove the converse we will need a Lemma. 
L. S 
Lemma; If U¡ () i=l. .. n are strictly quasi-concave and y>O,then y>O • 
• Proof;Suppose it is not,so y.:=O.But since L.E. is individually 
L.~", .... 
rational we have that U.(R -p y,y)~ U.(R.,O) V 1=1 ... n. 
l e I -., L 
If inequality occurs for sorne agent taking ay.a<l,he must be 
L 
better off. so y;. O is not his best choice in his budget seto 
Therefore all inequalities are strict.But this contradicts 
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that S.E. is Pareto Eficient. 
Proposition 4;If all utility functions are strictly quasi-
concave,then any S.E. is a L.E. 
Proof;Since Y'">O,/>O (by Lemma l).But Proposition 2 implies 
that any N.E. is a L.E. Since S.E. is a N.E. the proof is complete 
IV;THE SMOOTH CASE 
We assume the following. 
l;U¡() and y() are continu?~sly differentiable func-
tions. (""t._~ 
2; p~,O i=1. .. n. y"::>o 
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3; ~)is either a strictly increasing or a stricly decreasing 
~y 
function. 
~G\) . 
4: If ~t lS strictly decreasing - :li!) p- ;¡y characteJizes 
Pareto Efficient Allocations if y,>O. 
5; n)1. 
Assumption 4 requires that increasing returns to scale 
are not "large" relative to the curvature of utility functions. 
Then we have the follo\oling 
Proposition 5; Under assumptions 1-5 no N.E. can be Pareto 
Efficient (P.E.) (so no N.E. can be a L.E.) 
Proof; In any interior N.E. we havo that 
~~In~¡= (~r~+~"-~.y.J/~ 
'-'1 / ~,,¡ ¡ji l' ';;r 
(since W = y.) .. ~\} (ól~ r" (11-4.) ~JJV:ll1 H ") ,.. ~f +- -
over i \ole have that L :l.!t() ~ 1 
(la' ~,,~ 
other hand the neccesary condition for P.E. (see Laffont ch2.) ir 
Adding 
On the 
~I<':! ~It,::: ~Cl) 
H ~"': a, i t.o 
And both equations give the same solution only if n: 1,y~0 
or ~~l~ ~ (i.e. constant returns to scale). 
~, 
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V:FlNAL COMMENTS 
The essence of our procedure in order to treat the incentive 
compatibility (l.C.) of the L.E. is to construct a game in 
which consumers maximize their utility over the supply 
correspondence of the firm.lf we apply this procedure to 
Walker mechanism we find that in the smooth case,it is 
not l.C. (in our sense).Indeed Walker approach requires 
. ( ... ) 
that consumers take the price of the public good as parametrlc. 
However I.C. questions arose precisely because this price-
taking assumption was questioned! For example in the old 
discussions about the I.C. of Walrasian Equilibrium,agents 
were assumed to know not just prices,but supply functions 
of the other consumers.lndeed Walker acknoledges the point 
when he writes " .. the question whether a potential outcome 
is I.C. cannot be answered by simply determining whether that 
outcome is attainable as a Cournot-Nash equilibrium" (p.71). 
lndeed,as the usual proof of the existence of a Walrasian 
Equilibrium (W.E.) ma~es clear,W.E. is sorne kind of a N.E. 
in which an auctioneer is introduced in order to balance 
supply and demand.Moreover,the question of the existence of 
an auctioneer is not a feature of W.E. with respect to 
"artificial" mechanisms (Le. those by Hurwicz,Walker,etc) .. 
In this last kind of mechanisms someone has to send outcome 
functions to the players.ln this sense incentive theory 
replaces the Walrasian auctioneer (who sends prices) by a 
more sophisticated kind of auctioneer (who sends functions). 
(*) In other words his tax function has p as an argument.Curiously 
Walker writes these functions as if they were independent of p (q~ 
in his notation,see eq. (9) pg. 68.). 
I . 
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Returning to the incentive question,in any N.E. we can 
ask the following question; Given the behavior (not the 
action~of the other agents,can any player profitably deviate? 
Of course,if the answer for each agent is nO,we are not only 
in a N.E. but in a Stackelberg equilibrium (S.E.).However, 
as Dasgupta-Harnmond-Maskin have proved,these generalized 
S.E. (i.e. S.E. which are N.E.) are essentially equivalents to 
Dominant Strategies.Therefore in the public good case,the 
Gibbard-Satterthwite theorem applies (for a proof in the 
smooth case see Satterthwite-Sonnenschein (1981)).Thus it is 
apparent that the construction of mechanisms with -weak-
I.C. properties is essentially impossible in our case. 
The above discussion suggest that I.C. problems occur 
when sorne agent-or group of agents- can change profitably 
his behavior.This change may be caused by the fact that 
this agent posses a piece of information which was not 
suppose to be al their hands.Thus,in the Walrasian theory, 
if consumers knew only príces,price-takíng behavíor appears 
to be reasonable.However,if consumers knew supply functions 
of other consumers,price-taking behavior cannot be considered 
as rational.ln this way,I.C. problems may be related to the 
lack of privacy (i.e. agents know more than their own characte-
ristics). 
On the other hand results in this paper suggest that a 
comparison of pros and cons between Walker mechanism and 
the notion of S.E. discussed in this paper may be useful. 
(*) These authors have constructed a mechanism which for n)2, 
implem~nts succesfully Walrasian allocations.However they assume 
constant returns to scale.Our results suggest that this may be a 
( . 
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In the constant returns to scale case,both mechanisms implement 
(strongly) the set of Lindahl allocations (with minimal 
dimensionality of the message space).S.E. requires no auctioneer, 
it is more in tune with real life market institutions 
and at every point it is individually feasible.However it 
requires coalitions-in order to get rid of the pure free-riding 
N.E.- it is not globally feasible at every pOint,and it is 
not clear ( in a non monetary framework as our's) 
why agents should restrict themselves to consumption points 
inside their budget sets. 
On the other hand Walker approach requires an auctioneer in 
order to tell people the outcome functions,it represent a 
break with market institutions (so a lot of practical problems are 
likely to occur),and it is not individually feasible.Moreover 
it is not inmune to manipulation via coalitions.However,global 
feasibility is assured at every point. 
In the smooth case both the Walker mechanism and our N.E. 
do not yield efficient allocations.(Therefore S.E. does not exist) 
_._ ....... _ .. ~ .. ' ' ,-. ~ . 
~:.>-
:'f" 
.,-t~': 
------------------------ --- ----
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